405 advisors within its ranks. To address that issue, senior Campaign officials 406 asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice. After receiving Papadopoulos’s name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and 407 believed that he had credibility on energy issues. On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6, 2016, the two 408 spoke. Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of 409 the Campaign’s foreign policy. At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and 410 Papadopoulos accepted the offer. b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, 411 Papadopoulos traveled to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP. The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated with Link Campus University, 412 a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian government official. During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London 413 Academy of Diplomacy in London, England. Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the 414 first time that Papadopoulos met him. Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts 415 was IT█ █ █ █ █ █, a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I, Section II, supra). In January and February 2016, Mifsud and IT█ █ █ █ █ █ discussed IT█ █ █ █ █ █ possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not identify evidence of them meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016, IT█ █ █ █ █ █ was also in contact IT█ █ █ █ █ █ that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU’s hack-and-release operations