189 to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters, and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious 190 activity was identified. GRU officers Investigative Technique█ █ █ scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers Investigative Technique█ █ █ for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states. Investigative Technique█ █ █ Investigative Technique█ █ █ Similar IT█ █ █ for vulnerabilities continued through the election. Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election administration and personnel at companies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of PP█ █ █, a voting technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 191 2016 U.S. election. The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that 192 permitted the GRU to access the infected computer. The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government. The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so. D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases hacked materials throughout the summer and fall of 2016. Harm to Ongoing Matter█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 1. HOM█ █ █ a. Background